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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers who oversee law school administration seem to flout antitrust
law, which is somewhat ironic. A few years ago, the American Bar
Association ("ABA") settled a government lawsuit alleging that its law
school accreditation procedures collusively increased faculty salaries.'
The Justice Department maintained that an ABA rule requiring each law
school's faculty compensation to be comparable to that of other ABA-
approved law schools "restrained competition among professional
personnel at ABA-approved law schools" and "had the effect of
ratcheting up law school salaries."2 This Essay examines a current
practice, recommended by the Association of American Law Schools
("AALS"), which artificially suppresses faculty salaries.
Shortly before classes start for an academic year, an aggressive faculty
member might like to approach his or her dean and threaten to resign,
and perhaps teach elsewhere, unless his or her salary is increased. Law
school deans might dislike this strategy for a number of reasons. It
would increase some salaries. It might increase transaction costs,
because addressing problems at the last minute may not be as efficient as
following a planned process. It also might foster dissension among
faculty members, for those whose teaching responsibilities could easily
be covered (or lost) might receive relatively lower compensation.
The law schools might, therefore, seek to limit professors' bargaining
power by agreeing not to engage in the sort of competition that would
drive up faculty salaries. A statement issued by the AALS identifies
such a process. The statement memorializes an expectation that law
schools generally will not extend offers of indefinite employment to
' See United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive
Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421 (Aug. 2, 1995) (discussing consent decree settling
litigation) [hereinafter ABA Consent Decree], final judgment entered, United States v. Am.
Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996), modified, 135 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2001), No. 95-
1211 (RCL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2279 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001). Other recent litigation has
also raised antitrust issues concerning law school accreditation. E.g., Mass. Sch. of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026 (1st Cir. 1997); W. State Univ. of S. Cal. v.
Am. Bar Ass'n, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Stayer v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Fla. 2001). Those in medical education also recently faced allegations
of antitrust violations in Jung v. Association of American Medical Colleges, 300 F. Supp. 2d 119
(D.D.C. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss against certain, but not all, defendants in lawsuit
alleging antitrust violation in process of matching students with medical resident
positions), which prompted recent legislation. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596, 611-13 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 37b (LEXIS through
Pub. L. No. 109-1, Jan. 7, 2005)) (confirming federal and state antitrust laws do not prohibit
conduct of graduate medical education residency matching program).
ABA Consent Decree, supra note 1, at 39,424-25.
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sitting law professors after March 1.3
This Essay analyzes the antitrust implications of the arrangement
memorialized in the AALS statement. We find the issue interesting for
three reasons: First, one would have expected the recent settlement of
the ABA antitrust litigation regarding accreditation procedures to have
focused attention on the antitrust implications of other aspects of law
school administration. The continuation of this hiring policy is,
therefore, curious. Second, the AALS statement reflects an arrangement
among buyers, for law schools purchase teaching services from faculty
members. Antitrust challenges to potentially collusive arrangements
among buyers are increasingly common, and this apparent agreement
among law schools provides an interesting context in which to examine
buyer arrangements. Finally, we find it interesting that the arrangement
in question was promulgated by an organization of legal educators. That
fact says something about the ease with which sophisticated persons can
(one supposes inadvertently) create serious antitrust problems.
The purpose of this Essay is merely to examine the pertinent antitrust
issues. The Essay proceeds on the assumption that the AALS policy,
whose terms are precatory,5 speaks to what is in fact an agreement
among law schools. As noted below, the policy itself contemplates that
law school deans will seek waivers, in individual cases, extending the
time periods for up to two months. Were the policy to be litigated, law
schools might dispute the existence of an agreement. We believe,
though, that the nature of the policy strongly suggests that it represents
an agreement among law schools and that any litigation would yield
consistent evidence. Nothing in our individual experiences as faculty
members suggests otherwise. Reviewing the policy on that basis, we
' See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. The statement further provides that
offers for visiting positions must be extended by March 15, and it recommends that faculty
members not resign to accept another indefinite (nonvisiting) law school teaching position
later than March 15. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying motion to dismiss
antitrust action based on purported collusion among employers); John R. Wilke, How
Driving Prices Lower Can Violate Antitrust Statutes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at Al (reporting
on growth in number of antitrust lawsuits based on monopsony and buyer collusion).
' See infra text accompanying note 10.
6 To the extent law schools follow the policy, one could infer an agreement among
compliant law schools, for compliance with the policy (i.e., refusing to extend an offer to a
competitor's employee after a certain date) would be economically irrational for a law
school acting unilaterally. Such behavior would make economic sense only if there were an
agreement among the competing law schools to abide by the same policy. As such, in
litigation, the law schools' consciously parallel behavior would give rise to an inference of
agreement for purposes of the antitrust laws. Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939) (holding that consciously parallel behavior among competing movie
2005]
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conclude that the policy violates federal antitrust law.
I. THE AALS STATEMENT
The AALS is a not-for-profit corporation organized for the
"improvement of the legal profession through legal education." 7 The
members of the corporation include 166 law schools.8 In 1979, the
Executive Committee of the AALS9 adopted a Statement of Good
Practices for the Recruitment and Resignation by Full-Time Faculty
Members, which (as revised in 1984 and 1986) states:
Offer of Appointment. To permit a full-time faculty member to
give due consideration to an offer and timely notice of resignation
or request for leave of absence to his or her law school, a law school
should make an offer of an indefinite appointment as a teacher
during the following academic year no later than March 1 and of a
visiting appointment no later than March 15.
Resignation or Request for Leave of Absence. A full-time faculty
member should not resign to accept an indefinite appointment as a
teacher at another law school during the next academic year later
than March 15 nor request leave of absence to accept a visiting
appointment as a teacher later than April 1. A law school should
not offer an indefinite appointment or visiting position that
contemplates that the faculty member resign or request leave of
absence at a later date.
Consent of the Dean of the Law School. Even if the dean of the
law school on whose faculty the person serves has acquiesced, a law
school should not make an offer of an appointment as a teacher to a
full-time member of the faculty of a law school more than two
months later than the dates stated above and the faculty member
distributors implied agreement because behavior at issue made economic sense only if all
parties acted in concert).
' Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc. (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter
AALS Bylaws], reprinted in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW ScHOOLS, 2003 HANDBOOK 25
(2003) [hereinafter AALS HANDBOOK].
' See Association of American Law Schools, Inc., What Is the AALS?, at
www.aals.org/about.html (last visited March 16, 2005).
' Since 1977, the AALS's Bylaws have provided for an Executive Committee
consisting of nine members. AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 11. The Committee is
comprised of six faculty members of AALS-member law schools, who are elected at annual
meetings on staggered three-year terms, and the three officers of the AALS, who are also
on the faculty of AALS-member law schools. AALS Bylaws, supra note 7, §§ 4-1, 5-1.a,
5-1.b. . I
[Vol. 38:12991302
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should not resign or re uest leave of absence two months later than
the dates stated above.
The policy indicates that its purpose is to give the institution sufficient
time to arrange a replacement for a departing professor, and that it is
designed to "serve the best interests" of both the school a professor is
leaving and the school to which the professor is moving. Interestingly,
the policy does not purport to limit retirements after March 15 or post-
March 15 resignations to take positions outside law school teaching. The
disruption occasioned by such departures would, of course, be the same.
The exclusion of recommendations regarding forms of departure other
than those regulated by the policy is consistent with the view that the
arrangement is designed to inhibit competition among law schools for
incumbent faculty members (although one might argue that this
limitation reflects other factors, e.g., the infrequency of departures for
other reasons).12
1O AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93-94. The policy does not purport to be binding.
The policy states that the AALS "urges" that the practices be followed and states that the
timeframes are "to provide those who wish to proceed responsibly a guide to appropriate
conduct." Id. at 93. Although the AALS's bylaws contemplate that law schools may be
censured or excluded from membership for material failures to comply with obligations of
membership, AALS Bylaws, supra note 7, § 7-1, the bylaws provide that statements of
policy and regulations "are not meant to be taken as implying ... that departure from any
of their specific terms is automatically demonstrative of qualitative failure." AALS Bylaws,
supra note 7, § 2-2.b; cf., e.g., Bill L. Williamson, (Ab)Using Students: The Ethics of Faculty Use
of a Student's Work Product, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1029, 1032 n.7 (1994) (making similar point
about another Statement of Good Practices).
A similar kind of policy, which sets forth the pertinent times for decisions by faculty
members, is provided for universities, generally, by the American Association of
University Professors. See American Association of University Professors, Recommended
Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, at http://www.aaup.org
/statements/Redbook/Rbrir.htm (last visited March 16, 2005) ("Faculty members may
terminate their appointments effective at the end of an academic year, provided that they
give notice in writing at the earliest possible opportunity, but not later than May 15, or
thirty days after receiving notification of the terms of appointment for the coming year,
whichever date occurs later.").
AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93.
2 One might wonder whether the AALS is, in fact, a captive of law professors and,
therefore, this policy memorializes some form of ethical statement among law professors
(not law schools). That the policy does not limit late retirements to go into law practice is
consistent with the notion that the policy is not the product of an agreement among law
professors acting as law professors.
A separate AALS policy, however, could be more easily characterized in that way.
Three years after this Statement was last amended, a different Statement was adopted
addressing, inter alia, the timing of notice of a faculty member's resignation to "assume
another position," taking a leave of absence to teach, and assumption of "a temporary
position in practice or government." Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the
Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities, in AALS HANDBOOK, supra
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The simplicity of the AALS Statement belies the intricacy of mutual
assent to academic employment contracts. At some institutions, the
initial written agreements setting forth salary terms may condition the
institution's acceptance on approval by the university system's board of
regents." It would be inaccurate, then, to consider academic institutions
as universally helpless economic actors otherwise powerless when
confronted by last-minute negotiation by individual faculty members.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE AALS STATEMENT
By its terms, section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements in
restraint of trade. 14 Recognizing that a literal interpretation of the statute
would condemn practically all commercial contracts, courts have
interpreted the provision to preclude only unreasonable restraints of
trade." Specifically, section 1 creates liability where: (i) two or more
economic actors16 have entered an agreement; (ii) that agreement
unreasonably restrains trade or commerce; and (iii) the restraint affects
interstate commerce. 17 With respect to the AALS restraint, the third
note 7, at 95, 99.
13 E.g., Todd Ackerman, Why Take the Risk?: Professor Who'd Taken UH Job Reneges,
Citing Instability, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 15, 1993, at A18 (noting that written employment
agreement for political science professor signed by university's President was subject to
Board of Regents approval).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. 12001) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
"s Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very
essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911)
(interpreting section 1 to condemn only unreasonable restraints).
6 The reference is to "economic actors," as opposed to "persons," because, for
example, a business entity can only act through agents, 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL.,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.02 (2d ed. May 2004), and "the coordinated
activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single
enterprise for purposes of [section] 1 of the Sherman Act." Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
17 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 16, § 2.02.
Two other matters, pertinent to any actual litigation, merit mention. First, were a
professor to bring a private action seeking damages, the plaintiff would be required to
prove an injury stemming from the anticompetitive aspects of the policy. Id. § 3.04[1]. That
might be difficult to prove.
Second, particular defendants might assert immunity under the state action doctrine,
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), as has happened in claims alleging antitrust violations
by universities. E.g., Porter Testing Lab. v. Bd. of Regents for the Okla. Agric. & Mech.
Colls., 993 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1993); Cowboy Book, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents for Agric. &
[Vol. 38:12991304
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element is easily satisfied, for law professors are recruited on a
nationwide basis (frequently, at the AALS's own Faculty Recruitment
Conference or through its national Placement Bulletin), and any practice
that affects the hiring of law faculty thus has an effect on interstate
commerce. 8 We assume that the first requirement is satisfied, for the
AALS statement appears to memorialize an existing agreement among
the law schools.' 9 Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the second element
- whether the law schools' concerted restriction on the time period in
which lateral offers of employment may be extended constitutes an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
A threshold inquiry is whether "trade or commerce" is involved at all.
After all, the parties to the agreement are nonprofit educational
institutions, not profit-seeking businesses.20 That fact, however, cannot
prevent this agreement from creating Sherman Act liability.2' Although
Mech. Colls., 728 F. Supp. 1518, 1518-20 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (stating that Board of Regents
extending credit to students purchasing textbooks at Oklahoma State University bookstore
was immune from antitrust claim by private bookstore); Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of
N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 176 (M.D.N.C. 1989) ("While few cases have
considered whether universities and their governing boards are immune from suit under
the Sherman Act, decisions indicate that such immunity exists."); Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Chi. v. Bd. of Regents for Regency Univs., 607 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. 111. 1984).
Alternatively, litigation might be complicated by assertion of immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. E.g., Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Vratil, 96 F.3d 1337, 1339 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding nonparty state colleges entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from burden
of complying with discovery in connection with damages against NCAA on antitrust claim
concerning NCAA rule restricting coaches' earnings).
Because the intended scope of this Essay is limited to the primary issue of the
existence of an antitrust violation, and application of certain fact-intensive legal principles
is impracticable in the abstract, these ancillary issues pertinent to particular defendants are
not addressed here.
" Cf. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1991) (holding that alleged
group boycott of single eye surgeon satisfied interstate commerce requirement).
"9 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
20 This potential defense, of course, would not be pertinent to the limited number of
for-profit law schools, were any part of an agreement restricting competition. See generally,
e.g., In re Lewis, 86 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Ky. 2002) (describing Western State University College
of Law as for-profit); Beth Kormanik, Law School Weighs Specialties, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June
13, 2004, at B-1 (stating that owners of Florida Coastal School of Law are contemplating
opening series of for-profit law schools); Concord Law School, School Information, at
www.concordlawschool.com (describing Concord Law School as indirectly owned by
Washington Post Company) (last visited March 16, 2005). Florida Coastal School of Law is
an AALS nonmember, fee-paid law school. Association of American Law Schools, Inc.,
AALS Member Schools, at http://www.aals.org/members.html (last visited March 16,
2005).
21 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) (noting
that section 1 applies to nonprofit entities); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665
(3d Cir. 1993).
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the activities of a nonprofit entity are exempt from section 1 when they
represent "the antithesis of commercial activity,"22 the setting of
employees' salaries is commercial by nature and, therefore, is not an
exempt activity. 2 Accordingly, the agreement at issue involves trade or
commerce.
The key question is whether the agreement unreasonably restrains trade
or commerce. To answer that question, a reviewing court would employ
one of three modes of analysis, depending on the nature of the
agreement. For some types of agreements, courts simily presume
unreasonableness and declare the agreements illegal per se. Such per se
illegal agreements are those "whose nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed
to establish their illegality."2' Included in this category are naked
agreements 26 to fix prices or reduce output, agreements involving "bid-
rigging," horizontal market divisions, group boycotts, vertical
agreements maintaining resale prices, and certain agreements involving
tying and reciprocal dealing. If an agreement falls within one of the per
se illegal categories, then "(a) neither a relevant market nor an estimate
of the defendants' market power must be established to prove that the
restraint is unlawful; (b) harmful effects arepresumed; and (c) the range
of permissible defenses is severely limited."
Given the per se rule's restricted inquiry, and the consequent
possibility that a court may mistakenly condemn a procompetitive
practice without affording the defendant an opportunity to present a full
defense, the rule's scope is narrow.i Most types of agreements
challenged under section 1 are afforded a significantly more searching
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 665.
Cf. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming grant of permanent
injunction barring NCAA's enactment of limits on coaches' compensation).
" N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are certain agreements
or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use.").
' Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
16 A "naked" (or "nearly naked") buyers' cartel is one "where the only or principal
purpose of the agreement is to fix the buying price or output and where the challenged
restraint cannot be said to be ancillary to a significant integration of the firms' operations."
12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION 912010 (2000).
27 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 16, § 12.02[2].
11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 91 1910a.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1984)
(discussing "the shrinking per se rule").
[Vol. 38:12991306
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judicial inquiry under the "Rule of Reason," which requires analysis of
an agreement's impact on competition. 0 Specifically, a reviewing court
will first determine whether the challenged agreement has a
substantially adverse effect on competition and, if so, will then evaluate
whether the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct
justify the otherwise anticompetitive impacts.3
Traditionally, the Rule of Reason involved a probing inquiry that
included both the definition of the relevant market being restrained and
a detailed analysis of the facts peculiar to the defendant's business, the
history of the restraint, and the reasons for its imposition.3 Since the
Supreme Court's opinion in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,? however, courts have recognized that some restraints not
governed by the per se rule may be deemed unreasonable without
"elaborate industry analysis." 34 This so-called "quick look" analysis
represents a third approach to determining unreasonableness and is
appropriate where "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding
of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets."3
In evaluating the reasonableness of the restraint in the AALS
Statement, the choice among modes of analysis is ultimately
inconsequential.36  If the restraint were not declared per se illegal, it
' See ProJl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691 (noting that "the inquiry mandated by the Rule of
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition").
" See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 1998).
32 See Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (describing Rule of Reason inquiry). Justice Brandeis
described the Rule of Reason inquiry as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
- 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
14 Id. at 692.
'5 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
In actual practice, the distinctions among the three modes of analysis are rather
blurry. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 5.6c, at 257 (2d ed. 1999)
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1307 2004-2005
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would be deemed unreasonable - and thus illegal - under either a
"quick look" or Rule of Reason inquiry.
A. Is the Agreement Illegal Per Se?
An argument can be made that the agreement reflected in the AALS
Statement is per se illegal. The net effect of the agreement is that each
member law school, after the March 1 deadline, is granted the exclusive
right to bid for the professors on its faculty without worrying about
competing bids from rival law schools. The agreement thus resembles a
form of naked horizontal market division, which, as a general
37proposition, would be illegal per se.
A reviewing court, however, would probably refuse to invoke the per
se rule here. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to agply the per se
rule to practices with which it has had little experience. Because the
restraint in the AALS Statement represents a somewhat novel
arrangement, a court considering the restraint's legality would probably
find per se treatment inappropriate.3 9  Moreover, a reviewing court
might be reluctant to apply the per se rule in an otherwise appropriate
context simply because the parties are nonprofit educational
institutions.4o
(recognizing "the distinction between the per se rule and the rule of reason as soft rather
than hard").
3 The authors of the leading antitrust treatise have opined that similar agreements -
the so-called "reserve clauses" in professional sports contracts - should be considered per
se illegal:
Under the reserve clauses, the teams in a certain league or association agree not
to bid against one another for certain classes of players. For example, a player's
contract with Team X may provide that for one year after the initial contract
expires Team X will have a preemptive right to keep the player for an additional
year at the same salary. Such agreements are generally unlawful per se, but for
the fact that most qualify for the antitrust labor immunity when negotiated as
part of a collective bargaining process.
12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, 91 2013b.
' See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them
as per se violations of the Sherman Act.").
" Cf., e.g., Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Steams & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275, 296-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
4' See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (refraining from
declaring agreement among Ivy League institutions per se illegal because parties to
agreement were charitable educational organizations with "alleged pure altruistic motive"
and no apparent "revenue maximizing purpose").
1308 [Vol. 38:1299
HeinOnline  -- 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1308 2004-2005
Should Antitrust Education Be Mandatory
B. "Quick Look"
If the arrangement were not categorized as a per se violation, it
ultimately would be deemed unreasonable under one of the more
probing modes of analysis. Most likely, a court would condemn the
restraint using the truncated "quick look" analysis, because even a
cursory review identifies the anticompetitive effect.
Under the quick look analysis, as under the full-scale Rule of Reason,
the outcome-determinative question is whether the practice at issue
decreases or increases competition in the relevant market; courts are not
permitted to question whether competition in that market is reasonable
or desirable.4' Given this focused inquiry, the restraint in the AALS
Statement could not pass muster, for any observer with a basic
understanding of economics would conclude that the restraint reduces
competition in the market for law professors.42
Most obviously, the restraint diminishes competition by artificially
reducing the number of lateral employment offers that are extended. For
example, a law school that receives or confirms funding for an academic
"line" (position) after March 1 may not unilaterally seek to fill the
position with an experienced professor.43 A reduction in lateral offers
reduces competition and, thus, artificially lowers prices for the services
of experienced law professors.
In addition, the restraint diminishes competition and artificially
suppresses salaries in a more subtle way. Some set of law schools will
have retained discretion after March 1 to decide whether to renew
contracts and to fix the terms of compensation they propose to offer
professors. The restraint in the AALS Statement thus limits the ability of
faculty members to bargain as to the terms of their employment, by
eliminating options that otherwise would be available when terms of
employment may be finalized. It takes no more than "a rudimentary
" Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (stating that,
regardless of analytical approach employed, "the purpose of the analysis is to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an
industry... that policy decision has been made by the Congress").
42 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (noting that condemnation
under quick look is appropriate where "an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets").
43 Under the terms of the AALS Statement, the law school could extend a lateral offer
between March 1 and May 1, but only if it first procured the consent of the offeree's
incumbent dean. After May 1, a lateral offer would be prohibited even if the incumbent
dean consented. See AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 94.
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understanding of economics" to recognize that compliance with the
policy will reduce the number of lateral offers ultimately extended, will
impair a sitting law professor's ability to bargain as to the terms of
employment, will artificially preclude law professors from receiving full
value for their services, and will, thus, reduce the quantity or quality of
teaching services brought to market. Therefore, the AALS restraint
would probably be condemned under a quick look analysis.
C. Rule of Reason,
Were a court to decide that neither the per se rule nor the quick look
analysis is properly applied here, it would apply the Rule of Reason. In
a Rule of Reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
demonstrating that the restraint has a substantially adverse effect on
competition." Once the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to
the defendant to come forward with evidence of the procompetitive
virtues of the allegedly wrongful conduct.45 If the defendant is able to
demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff must then prove that
the challenged restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate
objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner.4 Applied to the AALS restraint, this three-step
analysis would reveal that the agreement is unreasonable and, thus,
illegal.
1. Substantially Adverse Effect on Competition
The above discussion of the quick look analysis explains why the
AALS restraint has a substantially adverse effect on competition. A full-
scale Rule of Reason inquiry would reveal the same anticompetitive
effect - albeit via a more complicated analysis.
Ordinarily, a basic difference between the quick look and a full-scale
Rule of Reason analysis is that the latter involves definition of the
relevant market. This fact-intensive inquiry is undertaken not because
proof of the relevant market is an end in itself, but because determining
the relevant market helps identify the impact that the challenged
•. 47
arrangement has on competition. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to prove that
the AALS restraint violates the Rule of Reason would likely proceed by
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
4 Id.
Id.
"' Id. at 1019-20.
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defining the affected market and then showing how the restraint reduces
competition within that market.
In a case involving an agreement among employers affecting
employment, market definition turns on the interchangeability, from the
perspective of an employee, of various jobs. Where there are few
substitutes for certain employment opportunities, those jobs constitute a
relevant market (and where there are available substitutes, the market
must be expanded to include the most substitutable positions).4
Applied to this particular case, the issue is the degree to which a slight
decrease in professor salaries at AALS law schools would cause
professors to quit their jobs.4 9  Given that there are few suitable
substitutes for law-teaching jobs at AALS law schools, it is highly likely
that a modest collusive salary reduction among the AALS members
would generate little quitting by professors. Thus, a court would likely
conclude that the relevant market is comprised of teaching positions at
AALS law schools.i°
Once the relevant market is defined, the focus shifts to the effect of the
restraint on competition within that market. As explained above, the
restraint at issue artificially reduces the number of available teaching
positions in the market, which means that professors must compete
harder - generally, by lowering their salary requirements - for the
reduced supply. The restraint also affects the ability of professors to
negotiate. Ultimately, these factors will result in lower faculty salaries,
which will dissuade individuals who might otherwise provide teaching
services from doing so and will lead to an inefficient allocation of
productive resources.
The AALS and member schools may argue that the restraint causes no
consumer harm because it does not reduce the number of students
graduated or credit hours taught. Of course, this "no output reduction"
argument fails to the extent that the decrease in lateral hiring prevents
law schools from expanding course offerings. Moreover, the argument
fails because professor quality51 is a relevant measure of output and will
diminish as salaries are artificially suppressed by the AALS restraint.1
2
" See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001) ("At issue is the
interchangeability, from the perspective of a [managerial, professional, and technical]
employee, of a job opportunity in the oil industry with, for example, one in the
pharmaceutical industry.").
49 Cf. id. at 204.
5' We won't quibble about whether the smattering of non-AALS law schools is part of
the relevant market.
For example, their understanding of antitrust.
52 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990) ("[Tlhe
131120051
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Thus, the restraint has an anticompetitive effect even if it does not reduce
the number of law school graduates or the number of credit hours
taught.
2. No Procompetitive Virtues
Confronted with the significant anticompetitive effects occasioned by
the restraint at issue, the AALS and its member institutions would seek
to prove offsetting procompetitive benefits, but their attempt would fail.
Reduced Disruption. The AALS Statement itself states that a rationale
for the restraint is that it avoids educational disruption.5 3 The mere fact
that untimely faculty departures create problems for the law schools
losing professors, however, cannot justify the AALS restraint. Because a
competitor law school will be willing to pay more than an incumbent
where the competitor is able to make better use of the input (i.e., the
professor at issue), free competition for sitting faculty facilitates an
optimal distribution of teaching resources. To say that rivals may agree
not to compete because the "loser" would face difficulties is to say that
competition itself may be limited because it is unreasonable. This is
precisely the sort of "ruinous competition" argument that the Supreme
Court has rejected time and again. Indeed, in Professional Engineers, the
Court called this sort of argument "nothing less than a frontal assault on
the basic policy of the Sherman Act."5 5 The Court rejected an agreement
'Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not
only lower prices, but also better goods and services.' This judgment 'recognizes that all
elements of a bargain - quality, service, safety, and durability - and not just the
immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative
offers."') (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978));
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that anticompetitive
harm resulted when salary caps reduced coaches' "incentive to improve their
performance").
5 The Statement explains:
[Tihe departure of a full-time law teacher always requires changes at the law
school. Unless the school is given sufficient time to make the necessary
arrangements to find another to offer the instruction given by the departing
teacher, the reasonable expectations of students will be frustrated and the
school's educational program otherwise disrupted.
AALS HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 93.
' See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (refusing
to credit "the age-old cry of ruinous competition" as justification for agreement to limit
price competition). See generally 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, 2015c ("In Socony the
Supreme Court categorically rejected the proposition that firms acting as buyers should be
permitted to collude in order to stabilize fluctuating or erratic markets.").
See Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
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designed to protect public safety because the purported safety benefits
were created by limiting competition among rivals. The Court explained
that, "[elven assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed
consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into
the question whether competition is good or bad."56 Thus, because "the
Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that
competition itself is unreasonable, 57 the AALS restraint cannot be
justified on the ground that it protects law schools against the harm
resulting from losing the competition for a sitting law professor.
Lower Costs of Education. The AALS and member law schools might
attempt to argue that the restraint at issue prevents bidding wars for
professors and, therefore, increases output by lowering the cost of legal
education. Cost-cutting by itself, however, is not a valid procompetitive
justification; if it were, any group of competing buyers could immunize
itself from liability stemming from any maximum price-fixing
agreement.58  From the standpoint of allocative efficiency, buyer
agreements that reduce competition and depress prices are just as
anticompetitive as seller agreements that artificially raise prices, and
they should be judged the same. Both types of agreements lead to an
inefficient allocation of productive resources. 9 Buyer agreements that
depress prices ultimately rob the sellers of the normal fruits of their
enterprises and, thus, reduce sellers' incentives to improve their
products and increase output.60 To the extent the restraint at issue here
decreases competition for law professors and depresses professor
salaries, it leads to reductions - quantitative or qualitative - in
educational output. __
Creation of an Otherwise Unavailable Product or Service. The AALS might
analogize the restraint at issue to restraints the Supreme Court has
upheld as ancillary to legitimate joint ventures. For example, in NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma," the Court recognized that
certain horizontal restraints among competing universities would be
5 Id.
" Id. at 696.
' See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998); 12 HOVENKAM, supra
note 26, 2013c (stating, as to motion picture "split" agreements, "[hlere as elsewhere in
the law of buyer's cartels, collusion is not justified by the assertion that the split agreement
enables theaters to obtain motion pictures at lower prices, and thus enables them to sell
movie tickets or provide other services at lower prices.").
"9 See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY 36-61 (1993) (discussing
inefficiencies created by buyer and seller collusion).
60 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1022.
61 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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necessary for the creation of college football and must, therefore, be
62deemed reasonable. The AALS might argue that the restraint at issue is
similarly necessary to facilitate the production of American legal
education. Or, the AALS might rely on Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States,6" in which the Court approved a commodities exchange rule
prohibiting buyers and sellers from negotiating the price of so-called "to
arrive" grain contracts during the afternoon and evening hours.6 In
upholding the exchange rule, the Court emphasized that the rule had the
effect of channeling all bids into the regular trading sessions of the
exchange, thereby creating more of "a public market for grain 'to
arrive.' The AALS might argue that its rule similarly enhances the
efficiency of the market for experienced law professors by forcing
bidding to occur within a confined time period.
Any such attempt to analogize to the Supreme Court's joint venture
cases would fail. NCAA actually undermines the view that the AALS
restraint is reasonable, for the Court was careful to emphasize that only
those restraints that were essential to the creation, of college football
would be deemed reasonable. 66 While it is conceivable that some
agreements among AALS member schools might be necessary for the
creation of American legal education, the restraint at issue certainly is
not one of them and is, therefore, more analogous to the restraints that
the NCAA Court deemed unreasonable. 67 Board of Trade is inapposite
because the rule at issue there (1) restricted only the period of price-
making, not (as here) the period in which contracts could be entered;"8 (2)
had a random effect on prices, 69 not (as here) a systematic tendency to
62 Id. at 101 (recognizing that certain otherwise suspect horizontal restraints among
rival universities with football teams could be reasonable because college football is "an
industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all").
246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id. at 239-40.
65 Id.
See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 105-07.
67 See id. (condemning restraints limiting broadcast rights because such restraints were
not necessary for production of college football).
6 246 U.S. at 239 (noting that "[tlhe restriction was upon the period of price-making
... there was no restriction upon the sending out of bids after close of the Call").
69 See 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, 2102 ("The point is not that no antitrust
challenge to the Chicago Board's call rule is possible. Rather, the challenge that was
articulated in that case did not explain how the rule led to higher prices, reduced market
output, or had other anticompetitive effects. The plaintiff must provide in its complaint at
least a theory about how the challenged behavior will produce recognizably
anticompetitive effects. If no such theory can even be pled, then the complaint should be
dismissed without further inquiry." (footnote omitted)).
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reduce prices below competitive levels; and (3) encouraged participation
in a public bidding session, which does not exist here.70 More generally,
these cases - and all the cases in which the Supreme Court has
approved horizontal restraints among competitors - are inapposite
because the approved restraints resulted in the creation of some product
or service that could not have existed otherwise.71 The AALS restraint,
by contrast, is not necessary for the creation of anything that would
otherwise be unavailable.
Circumventing Supracompetitive Prices Caused by Other Cartels. As noted
above, recently settled litigation involved allegations of improper actions
in the law school accreditation process that would have increased
professors' salaries.7 The AALS and member law schools might,
therefore, try to justify the restraint at issue as a means of circumventing
the supracompetitive salaries resulting from the improper conduct of
others in the salary-setting process. Of course, that should not give rise
to a current defense - the ABA antitrust litigation was settled in 1996. 73
Moreover, the preeminent treatise indicates that the existence of a seller's
cartel should not give rise to a defense to a challenge in a buyer's cartel.74
3. Less Restrictive Means Available
Even if a court were to credit one of these purportedly procompetitive
justifications for the AALS restraint, the restraint would still be
unreasonable, and thus illegal, because its ends could be achieved in a
less restrictive manner.75  Any law school concerned about untimely
70 The rule in Board of Trade had the effect of forcing all price bidding into the public
market, so as to increase the efficiency of that market. See Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239 ("The
rule made it to their interest to attend the Call; and if they did not fill their wants by
purchases there, to make the final bid high enough to enable them to purchase from
country dealers."). As there is no centralized public market for law professors, the AALS
restraint can provide no similar benefits.
" See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (stating that certain horizontal restraints are necessary to
create college football); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979)
(stating that horizontal restraints are necessary for creation of blanket music licenses, which
otherwise would not have been available); Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933) (stating that horizontal price agreement was necessary to facilitate output-enhancing
joint marketing arrangement among coal manufacturers); Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 239-40
(stating that restraint is necessary to create efficient public market in "to arrive" grain).
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 934 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1996) (final judgment),
modified, 135 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2001), No. 95-1211 (RCL), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2279
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001).
74 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, 1 2015b.
11 See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTrRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION 1 1505 (2000) ("An apparently anticompetitive restraint can be
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departures could protect itself through unilateral action. For example, it
might negotiate contract terms with faculty members specifying
reasonable liquida ed damages professors must pay if they depart before
a certain date (which would be determined by the law school
individually, based on its own assessment of its planning process).
Alternatively, a law school set to lose a professor could negotiate for the
departing faculty member to teach in the following term for an agreed-
upon fee on a schedule that accommodated simultaneous appointments
at two institutions.76 Either approach would accommodate legitimate
concerns less restrictively than the restraint reflected in the AALS
Statement. Accordingly, the restraint is unreasonable and, thus, illegal.
CONCLUSION
The long-standing AALS Statement of Good Practices concerning the
timing of appointments to faculty positions, to the extent that it
memorializes an agreement among member law schools, represents a
violation of federal antitrust law. The effect of such an agreement is to
reduce the number of positions available to faculty members and to
inhibit professors in bargaining for compensation. Antitrust law would
not justify this arrangement as an attempt to offset the power of a
competing cartel that might operate to inflate professor salaries.
The preceding discussion is confined to examining the antitrust
implications of the arrangements memorialized in the AALS Statement.
Yet, at least in some quarters, a piece of legal scholarship seems to be
viewed as incomplete unless it has some sort of proposal, even one that
is wildly impracticable or unrealistic. In the spirit of complying with
that norm, we propose (or, more precisely, the one of us who does not
teach antitrust, and is unlikely to be viewed as part of a cartel of antitrust
professors, proposes) inclusion of a mandatory antitrust component
somewhere in legal education or testing.
redeemed only if reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. To be reasonably
necessary, the restraint must not only promote the legitimate objective but must also do so
significantly better than the available less restrictive alternatives.").
76 Presumably it is the short-term loss of teaching services, and not research, that is the
legitimate concern of the incumbent employer.
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